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Abstract
Background: Regulations on forgoing life-sustaining treatment (LST) have developed in Asian countries including
Japan, Korea and Taiwan. However, other countries are relatively unaware of these due to the language barrier. This
article aims to describe and compare the relevant regulatory frameworks, using the (more familiar) situation in
England as a point of reference. We undertook literature reviews to ascertain the legal and regulatory positions on
forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England.
Main text: Findings from a literature review are first presented to describe the development of the regulatory
frameworks surrounding the option of forgoing LST in each country. Based on the findings from the four countries, we
suggest five ethically important points, reflection on which should help to inform the further development of
regulatory frameworks concerning end-of-life care in these countries and beyond. There should be reflection on: (1)
the definition of – and reasons for defining – the ‘terminal stage’ and associated criteria for making such judgements;
Korea and Taiwan limit forgoing LST to patients in this stage, but there are risks associated with defining this too
narrowly or broadly; (2) foregoing LST for patients who are not in this stage, as is allowed in Japan and England,
because here too there are areas of controversy, including (in England) whether the law in this area does enough to
respect the autonomy of (now) incapacitated patients; (3) whether ‘foregoing’ LST should encompass withholding and
withdrawing treatment; this is also an ethically disputed area, particularly in the Asian countries we examine; (4) the
family’s role in end-of-life decision-making, particularly as, compared with England, the three Asian countries
traditionally place a greater emphasis on families and communities than on individuals; and (5) decision-making with
and for those incapacitated patients who lack families, surrogate decision-makers or ADs.
Conclusion: Comparison of, and reflection on, the different legal positions that obtain in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and
England should prove informative and we particularly invite reflection on five areas, in the hope the ensuing
discussions will help to establish better end-of-life regulatory frameworks in these countries and elsewhere.
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Background
Recently, two critical laws on end-of-life care were
enacted in Asia. One is the Act on Decisions on Life-
Sustaining Treatment for Patients in Hospice and Pallia-
tive Care or at the End of Life (hereafter, LST Decision
Act), which was enforced in early 2018 in Korea [1, 2].
This Act permits the withdrawal of LST from patients at
the end of life. The other is the Patient Right to Auton-
omy Act (hereafter PRAA) enforced in early 2019 in
Taiwan [3]. Much earlier, in 2000, Taiwan enacted the
Hospice Palliative Care Act, which permits withdrawal
of treatment from terminally ill patients at their request.
The new law allows treatment withdrawal not only from
terminally ill patients, but also from any patient who is
in an irreversible coma, in a vegetative state, has severe
dementia, or otherwise suffers from unbearable pain.
In contrast to these two countries, Japan has yet to
pass a law on forgoing LST, even though the public dis-
cussion on the issue has been ongoing for over a decade.
In 2007, Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
(hereafter, MHLW) issued the Guideline for Medical
Decision-Making Process in End-of-Life (Terminal) Care
(hereafter, the Process Guideline); however, it does not
explicitly permit or prohibit forgoing LST. In 2012, a
group of non-partisan Diet Members proposed a draft
Bill for Respecting the Patient’s Decision in End-of-Life
Care Act (provisional name; hereafter, the draft AD Bill),
which offers immunity to physicians if they withhold or
withdraw LST in accordance with the patient’s advance
directive (hereafter, AD). As of 2019, the proposed draft
AD Bill has yet to be submitted to the National Diet.
As portrayed above, regulatory developments on forgo-
ing LST have progressed in these three countries to differ-
ing degrees. Unfortunately, the nature and specifics of
these remain relatively unknown to other countries, partly
due to the language barrier. The legislation, guidelines,
and deliberation processes are typically posted only in the
native language on the websites of health ministries and
parliaments of these countries, so the regulatory schemes
for end-of-life care are little known beyond the particular
jurisdiction, even by neighbouring Asian countries.
Many Western countries formulated public policies
about forgoing LST in end-of-life care prior to most
Asian countries.1 England is one such example, along
with the US and other English-speaking countries in-
cluding Australia and Canada. Looking specifically to the
English legal system, professional medical organisations
have long published guidance on end-of-life care, includ-
ing the doctors’ trade union the British Medical Associ-
ation (hereafter, BMA) and the doctors’ regulator in
England, the General Medical Council (hereafter,
GMC)2,3,4,5 English law primarily derives from the com-
mon law (i.e. the decisions of judges) and Acts of Parlia-
ment. Although common law had long governed LST
decisions, in 2007 the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (here-
after, MCA) came into force, which covers LST deci-
sions for adult patients who lack “mental capacity” [4].
Comparison of the situations in Korea, Taiwan and
Japan with the situation in England is useful as it enables
clarification of legal and philosophical issues pertaining to
the legalisation of forgoing LST. We believe that the re-
sults of such a comparison will be valuable for critical re-
flection on the relevant laws and policies, in these
countries and others. To this end, the present study in-
volved a literature review to examine the laws, guidelines,
and newspaper articles relevant to this issue. Below, we
first summarise the development of regulatory frameworks
on forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England.
We then compare the regulatory frameworks on forgoing
LST in each country. Finally, we discuss legal and philo-
sophical issues concerning forgoing LST that need to be
addressed in order to create better regulatory frameworks
for end-of-life care in Asian countries and worldwide.
Main text
Development of regulatory frameworks with regard to
forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England
Japan
In Japan, court cases and other incidents highlighting prob-
lems associated with LST withdrawal increased the mo-
mentum for legislation. While no Bill has been submitted
to the National Diet for deliberation, several ethical guide-
lines have been created. Here, in order to better understand
the current situation in Japan, we summarise two crucial
court cases and one incident regarding the forgoing of LST.
The Tokai Case (1991) In this case, the attending phys-
ician withdrew treatment from a 58-year-old patient suf-
fering from end-stage multiple myeloma at Tokai
University Hospital. The physician then administered
sedative drugs to stop the patient from stertorous
breathing, followed by potassium chloride, which causes
heart failure if injected undiluted. The patient subse-
quently died from cardiac arrest, and the attending phys-
ician was prosecuted for homicide. In March 1995, the
1In the United States, beginning with California’s enactment of the
Natural Death Act in 1976, all states had enacted AD-related laws by
2000.
2England comprises different legal systems; our focus will be on
English law i.e. essentially the law of England and Wales.
3See: <https://www.bma.org.uk/> (accessed 25 April 2019).
4The General Medical Council (GMC) in England is an independent
organisation and statutory regulator for the medical profession in
England. Its guidance applies to doctors working in all four UK
countries (i.e., England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). In
addition, the GMC helps protect patients and improve medical
education and practice.
5See: <https://www.gmc-uk.org/> (accessed 25 April 2019).
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Yokohama District Court found the attending physician
guilty of murder and sentenced him to 2 years in prison
with 2 years of suspension [5]. In the ruling, the Court not
only set forth admissibility requirements for active euthan-
asia, but also provided admissibility criteria for forgoing
LST in the obiter dictum (Table 1). Although the Tokai
Case concluded at the district court level without appeal,
the decision had a considerable impact on Japanese soci-
ety and influenced subsequent discussions, not only on ac-
tive euthanasia, but also concerning the forgoing of LST.
The Kawasaki Case (1998) In the case of Kawasaki
Kyodo Hospital, the attending physician removed the
endotracheal tube from a 58-year-old patient upon re-
quest from the patient’s family. The patient was uncon-
scious due to hypoxic brain injury accompanied by status
asthmaticus [6–8]. When the physician could not alleviate
the patient’s heavy breathing, she ordered an assistant
nurse to inject a muscle relaxant, and the patient eventu-
ally died. The doctor was later charged with homicide.
The most distinctive aspect of the Kawasaki case was
that the disputed point in the Supreme Court was the il-
legality of treatment withdrawal. Both the Yokohama Dis-
trict Court and the Tokyo High Court in the Kawasaki
Case decided that treatment withdrawal was illegal be-
cause two requirements for withdrawing treatment had
not been fulfilled, specifically “the physician’s duty of care”
and “the patient’s autonomy”, respectively corresponding
to the first and second admissibility requirements in the
Court decision of the Tokai Case. The physician was ac-
cordingly convicted of homicide. In early 2007, the Tokyo
High Court sentenced the physician to 1 year in prison
with 3 years of suspension. In 2009, the Supreme Court
ruled to uphold the High Court ruling.
The Imizu Incident (2000-2005) In the Imizu Munici-
pal Hospital incident, two physicians withdrew artificial
ventilators from seven terminally ill patients in their 50s
to 90s in response to requests either from the patients
or their families [9, 10].6 All patients died following re-
moval of the ventilators. In 2006, the incident made na-
tional headlines, with the hospital director apologising
that his staff had undertaken “ethically problematic”
treatment withdrawal. In 2008, the police referred the
physicians to public prosecutors. By the end of 2009,
however, the Public Prosecutors Office decided not to
prosecute due to insufficient evidence [11].
Both the Kawasaki Case and the Imizu Incident fuelled
the fears of healthcare professionals about facing legal or
social sanctions over forgoing treatment, and clarifica-
tion of the legal (im)permissibility of forgoing LST be-
came an urgent issue for the government and
professional medical associations. In 2007, soon after the
High Court Decision on the Kawasaki Case and the ex-
posé of the Imizu Incident, the MHLW issued the
Process Guideline, which addressed the issue of LST
withdrawal (details explained below in Section 2) [12].
Several professional associations also published end-of-
life guidelines, including the 2014 Guideline on End-of-
Life Care in Acute Care and Intensive Care (compiled
collaboratively by the Japanese Association for Acute
Medicine, the Japanese Society of Intensive Care Medi-
cine, and the Japanese Circulation Society) [13], the
2007 Guideline on End-of-Life Care (Japan Medical As-
sociation) [14], and the 2012 Guidelines for Decision
Making Process of Elderly Care: Focusing on the Use of
Artificial Hydration and Nutrition (Japan Geriatrics So-
ciety) [15].
However, even after publication of the MHLW’s
Process Guideline and other professional guidelines,
healthcare professionals were not sure about the legality
of forgoing LST. For example, in 2008, 1 year after the
publication of the MHLW’s Process Guideline, the ethics
committee at the Kameda Medical Center approved the
withdrawal of the artificial ventilator from a patient with
Motor Neurone Disease (MND), but the hospital dir-
ector chose not to follow the committee’s advice due to
legal uncertainty [16–18].7,8,9 This situation led to the
drafting of an AD Bill in 2012 by a group of non-
Table 1 Admissibility requirements for forgoing treatment
established by the Yokohama District Court in the Tokai Casea
Three admissibility requirements for forgoing LST
1. The patient has no hope of recovery and death is imminent.
2. It is desirable that the patient has declared his or her wishes when
forgoing treatment is considered an option. It is permissible to presume
the family’s will to be the patient’s will, provided that the patient’s
family makes a deliberate decision that takes into consideration the
patient’s perspective.
3. Treatments that can be forgone include all treatments considered to
be curative measures, supportive measures, or LST, e.g., drug
administration, chemotherapy, artificial dialysis, artificial ventilator, blood
transfusion, and artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).
aThe term they actually use in the decision is “stop treatments (chiryo chushi),”
but because there appears to be no distinction in the decision between
withholding treatments and withdrawing them, we interpreted the word
“stop” to mean “forgoing”
6On 28 April 2016, one of the authors (TANAKA) was able to view
this important report which the hospital had submitted to the
Shinminato District Police on 17 October 2005, by gaining access to
the official files of Imizu City.
7ALS is a rare neurological disease that mainly involves nerve cells
(neurons) responsible for controlling voluntary muscle movements
that enable actions such as chewing, walking, and talking. Currently,
there is no cure for ALS and no effective treatment to halt, or reverse,
the progression of the disease.
8See: <https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-
Education/Fact-Sheets/Amyotrophic-Lateral-Sclerosis-ALS-Fact-
Sheet> (accessed 25 April 2019).
9See: <http://www.nanbyou.or.jp/entry/52> (accessed 25 April 2019)
(in Japanese).
Tanaka et al. BMC Medical Ethics           (2020) 21:99 Page 3 of 15
partisan Diet Members.10 Seven years later, the draft AD
bill has yet to be submitted to the National Diet.
Korea
In Korea, the Boramae Hospital Case and the Severance
Hospital Case were critically important in shaping the public
discussion and subsequent legislation on LST withdrawal.
The Boramae Hospital Case (1997) The attending
physician at Boramae Hospital removed the artificial ven-
tilator from a 58-year-old patient, who had been admitted
to an intensive-care unit (ICU) after a surgical operation
due to massive intracranial haemorrhage, following a re-
quest from the patient’s wife [19, 20]. The doctor and the
patient’s wife were subsequently charged with homicide
and prosecuted as joint offenders. The medical team in
the hospital had tried to persuade the wife to continue the
patient’s treatment in the hospital, but she requested that
the patient be discharged because of the financial burden
of further hospitalisation, and the team decided to dis-
charge the patient. Less than 5 min after leaving the hos-
pital, the patient developed respiratory difficulties and
died. Expecting to be the beneficiary of a free funeral ser-
vice if police were engaged, the wife reported this as an
unexpected death to the police, and it led to a court case.
In 2004, the Supreme Court sentenced the physician
to 18months in prison and 2 years of probation. The
Court ruled that if the physicians discharged the patient
at the request of the patient’s wife and were aware that
the reason for the wife’s discharge request was the death
of the patient and that discharge of the patient would
lead to his death, then the physicians were guilty as ac-
complices to murder. This ruling came as a shock to
many Korean physicians. Until then, proxy decisions by
the patient’s family had been generally accepted as es-
sential grounds on which physicians could make difficult
choices regarding treatment. However, the court deci-
sion reminded physicians of their duty to act in the best
interests of the patient before complying with the will of
a (potentially untrustworthy) proxy. However, physicians
regarded this decision as requiring them to do their best
to prevent the death of the patient [21].
The Severance Hospital Case (2008) A 77-year-old fe-
male patient at Severance Hospital suffered hypoxic
brain damage due to severe bleeding from the pulmon-
ary artery, which was a complication arising during
bronchoscopic biopsy [20]. She was deemed to be in a
persistent vegetative state (PVS) and could not breathe
sufficiently on her own. Her family asked the hospital to
withdraw the artificial ventilator from the patient, but
the hospital refused. The family filed a lawsuit and won
the case at the Supreme Court level.
This case was different from the Boramae Hospital Case
in two respects. First, the patient was thought to be irre-
versibly dying.11 Second, the Court judged the family’s
proxy decision to be the patient’s will. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court pointed out the necessity of legislation on
forgoing LST that respects the right to pursue happiness,
as guaranteed by the Korean Constitution.
Along with these court cases, the following significant
events happened in Korean society [19, 20]. In 2002, in re-
sponse to the Boramae trial, the Korean Association of
Medical Societies (KAMS) proposed the KAMS Guideline
on Forgoing LST. In 2009, in response to the Severance
case, the KAMS, the Korean Medical Association, and the
Korean Hospital Association together established a set of
guidelines on forgoing LST. Creation of these guidelines
attracted the attention of legal and ethical professionals,
policymakers, and medical professionals [20]. Several Bills
on withdrawing LST were submitted to the National Diet
from 2006 to 2015. These developments led the govern-
ment to set up consultation bodies in 2009 and to take
measures to facilitate social consensus-building around
these topics. The topics included whether or not treatments
may be withdrawn only from terminally ill patients,
whether LST (including cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
artificial ventilation but not ANH) may be withdrawn, and
whether and to what extent physicians must respect patient
autonomy. These developments culminated in the enact-
ment in 2016, and full enforcement in 2018, of the Hospice
Palliative Care and LST Decision Act.
Taiwan
Taiwan was one of the first Asian countries to create a law
on forgoing LST.12,13,14 It is believed that the practice of
“terminal discharge from hospital” played an important
role in shaping the public discussion and subsequent legis-
lation concerning LST. In Taiwan, the term “terminal
10Prior to this, a group of non-partisan Diet Members had announced
a draft proposal in 2007 that would allow withdrawal of LST, but this
was only an outline of a bill and was never submitted to the National
Diet. The outline of the draft AD bill in 2012 was made public at the
end of 2011. The initial plan allowed only terminally ill patients to
withhold LST.
11In the strict sense, the patient was near PVS (her brain responded to
external stimuli, that she has minimal consciousness) but medical
professionals expected she would not survive the condition very long.
The Court recognised the professionals’ prediction, so the Court
mentioned it as “irreversible dying stage”. So it ruled that the hospital
should respect the patient’s preference. Ironically she regained the
respiration ability, and lived another 7 months after the court decision.
12Other countries include Thailand and Singapore. Thailand enacted
the National Health Act, B.E. 2550 in 2007. Singapore enacted the
Advance Medical Directive Act in 1997. Discussion of the situation in
these countries is beyond the scope of this paper.
13See: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=
82872&p_country=THA&p_count=441> (accessed 25 April 2019).
14See: <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/AMDA1996> (accessed 25 April
2019).
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discharge” refers to the practice of allowing terminally ill pa-
tients to spend the last few hours or days with their families
at home by being discharged from the hospital of their own
will or their family’s proxy decision. The legitimacy of such
practice was recognised as part of the “discharge at patient’s
request,” which was stipulated in the Medical Care Act in
1986 [22, 23]. Since then the practice of “terminal discharge”
has been widely accepted in the clinical scene in Taiwan.
Along with the above development, the hospice move-
ment began to take root in Taiwan [22, 24]. In 1983, a
substantial discussion on the need for hospices and pal-
liative care began, and the first hospice program was set
up in 1987, followed by the creation of the first hospice
unit in Taiwan in 1990 [25]. Since then, several hospice
wards have been established in both public and private
hospitals, and many religious hospice foundations and
non-profit hospice organisations have been created.
As the hospice movement developed in Taiwan, calls for
the legalisation of forgoing LST grew amongst healthcare
professionals in 1989. The Ministry of Health and Welfare
(formerly the Department of Health; upgraded as MHW
in 2013) was initially reluctant to answer such requests be-
cause the officials believed it was too early to discuss such
an issue. However, as the hospice movement progressed
in Taiwan, the MHW indicated in 1996 that providing
palliative care and withholding LST were within the realm
of a doctor’s “duty of care” and, therefore, not illegal. Fol-
lowing the policy change in MHW, healthcare profes-
sionals sought legislation on Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
orders, in order to allow patients to die naturally in hos-
pital [22]. As a result, the Hospice and Palliative Care Act
was enacted in 2000, legalising the withholding of LST
from terminally ill patients in line with their ADs (includ-
ing a healthcare proxy to legally make healthcare decisions
on behalf of patients) or their family’s consent. The law
was amended several times and now also permits LST
withdrawal at the patient’s or family’s request, as described
in more detail in Section 2 below.
Although the Act contributes to the development of
Hospice in Taiwan, it was criticised for not fully respecting
patient self-determination for two reasons. First, the physi-
cian’s duty to tell the truth, to disclose a diagnosis, or to
obtain consent from the patient is not explicitly stipulated
[26]. Second, even after the law was enforced, the patient’s
family primarily make decisions to withhold or withdraw
LST [27]. In response to these criticisms, the PRAA was
passed at the end of 2015 and enforced in January 2019.
England
The law and professional guidance permit LST to be
withdrawn or withheld, not only from patients who have
mental capacity and have refused such treatment but
also from patients who lack mental capacity. The rele-
vant principles were initially enshrined in professional
guidance and court rulings, but some have since been
set down in the MCA. The crucial first ruling in this
area was Bland, which concerned a patient who lacked
the mental capacity to make decisions about his treat-
ment at the relevant time [28, 29].
The Bland Case (1989) Anthony Bland (then 18-years-
old) was trapped in a crush at the Hillsborough Football
Stadium disaster in Sheffield (England) and later diag-
nosed to be in a PVS. Three years passed without any
improvement in his condition. He had not indicated his
will concerning the treatment in advance. However, the
hospital Trust and Bland’s family came to believe that
treatment withdrawal was appropriate as they perceived
no benefit in treatment continuation. The hospital ap-
plied to the court, seeking a declaration that the with-
drawal of Bland’s ANH would be lawful.
In 1993, the House of Lords, the then superior court, ruled
that withdrawing LST is an omission, which can be justified
if a responsible body of doctors hold that treatment is not in
the patient’s best interests [30, 31]. The court ruled that fu-
ture such cases involving patients in the PVS should be
brought before a judge for a decision as to whether or not
LST should (continue to) be provided. After the decision,
Bland’s ANH was withdrawn, and he died shortly afterwards.
PVS cases involving ANH were, therefore, a matter for
the judges and the requirement was subsequently ex-
tended to patients in the minimally conscious state
(MCS) [32]. However, the (now) superior court, the Su-
preme Court, has recently confirmed that there is no re-
quirement to bring such cases to court [33]. This means
that, regardless of the patient’s diagnosis or the treat-
ment to be withdrawn, decisions do not require court
approval, although difficult or contested situations may
still come before the judges. Instead, LST decisions are
generally a matter for the healthcare professionals, albeit
in consultation with the incapacitated patient’s loved
ones. Following the Bland case, professional societies is-
sued guidelines on forgoing LST. These included the
BMA, which published guidance on withholding and
withdrawing LST in 1999 [34]. The GMC also published
guidance, entitled “Withholding and withdrawing - guid-
ance for doctors” in 2002, which set the standards of
practice expected of doctors when they consider whether
to withdraw or withhold treatments that might prolong
a patient’s life [35]. In 2010, the latter was replaced with
new guidance, entitled “Treatment and care towards the
end of life: good practice in decision making.” The
GMC’s current guidance provides a framework for good
practice regarding the provision of treatment and care to
patients who are likely to die within a year [36]. There
are also more specific guidance documents, focused on
(for example) decisions about CPR and, most recently,
ANH [37, 38].
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The various professional guidance encompasses not only
incapacitated patients, but also patients who have “mental
capacity” (or competence). The common law had long de-
fined capacity in functional terms, i.e. the focus was on
whether the patient could comprehend and retain relevant
information and reach a decision [39]. The common law
had also long recognised the right of a competent adult pa-
tient to refuse LST, a position most powerfully confirmed
in Re B in 2002, in which a ventilator-dependent patient
had this unwanted treatment withdrawn at her request
[40]. Furthermore, the common law also recognised an
adult patient’s right to make an AD refusing treatment they
might otherwise receive in the future when incapacitated:
provided that the patient was competent and informed, and
their advance directive applied to the situation that later
arose, their refusal had to be respected [41].
Many of these propositions were then enshrined in the
MCA in 2005, thus replacing the common law [4, 42]. As
the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology re-
ported, “while healthcare practice had to operate according
to these common law judgements, historically it has been
guided by more paternalistic concepts of duty of care with-
out a strong legal awareness. Outside of hospitals, however,
for many carers of people with learning disabilities, demen-
tia or mental illness, concerns were expressed about the
lack of legal guidance [43]”. The MCA, therefore, provided
a statutory test for mental capacity and generally provided
that decisions about patients who lacked capacity were to
be made in their “best interests”. Although there is no strict
legal test of best interests, the courts have increasingly
emphasised the importance of respecting the patient’s
wishes and values [44]. Furthermore, the Act also placed
ADs – specifically now labelled “advance decisions to refuse
treatment” – on a statutory footing, and for the first time
provided for surrogate decision-making, through the cre-
ation of “lasting powers of attorney” (hereafter LPA). De-
tails of the law are explained below.
Comparison of regulatory frameworks in the four
countries
This section compares the regulatory frameworks of the four
countries regarding forgoing LST. The foci under compari-
son include: the legal effectiveness of advance directives; eli-
gibility criteria for medical conditions; the definition of
‘terminal phase’; and proxy decision-making by the patient’s
family.15
Japan
In Japan, the Tokyo High Court ruling in the Kawasaki
Case highlighted the need for a law or guidelines on for-
going LST, yet no relevant law has been enacted to date.
The MHLW’s Process Guideline issued in 2007 has been
the most influential document in this area to date.16 It
consists of the main body and commentary, and contains
two core elements: 1) respecting patient self-
determination and 2) deciding the course of care by the
healthcare team (and not by the attending physician
alone). The Process Guideline stipulates that the health-
care team shall make healthcare decisions through re-
peated discussions with patients and their families, with
a particular emphasis on respecting the patient’s will. It
also specifies that if patients cannot express their will,
the healthcare team shall decide the best course of care
in light of the family’s wishes. The Guideline further
states that if it is difficult for the healthcare team to de-
cide or reach a consensus with patients or their family, a
committee composed of multiple experts should be set
up for consultation. In this way, the Process Guideline
puts a significant emphasis on consensus-building
among those involved in the patient’s end-of-life care.
Interestingly, the Process Guideline is silent on the fol-
lowing two points. First, the main body of the Process
Guideline does not define “the terminal stage” or when
the patient is considered as terminal or facing the end-
of-life stage, even though this phrase appears in the very
title of the Guideline [45].17 The commentary of the
Guideline does state that there can be different types of
terminal stages according to the patient’s disease, which
could include terminal cancer, chronic disease, cerebro-
vascular disease, and senility. The healthcare team is
instructed to judge when the patient has reached the ter-
minal stage through careful assessment of the patient’s
condition. However, the Guideline does not provide any
specific criteria that would define the terminal stage,
such as “six months to live”. Second, it is unclear
whether healthcare professionals can avoid criminal or
civil liability for forgoing LST if they act according to
15All of these countries have a national healthcare system covering all
citizens. As for differences, the three Asian countries have adopted the
social insurance scheme for healthcare, for which citizens of these
countries must pay some healthcare costs at the time they receive
care. Meanwhile, England’s national healthcare system is run by tax
money, and people do not have to pay when they receive medical care.
16In Japan, administrative guidelines with no legal basis have neither
direct legal force in courts nor any direct effects on the rights and
duties of citizens. The Process Guideline has no legal basis, and lack
penal or administrative sanctions. However, the guideline is widely
understood to express the official position of the MHLW concerning
end-of-life care, and is therefore often cited in relevant literature as
well as in the media.
17Incidentally, in 2015, the MHLW revised the title of the Process
Guideline to “the Process Guideline for the Medical Decision-making
at the Last Stage of Life (jinsei no saisyu dankai),” because the term
“end-of-life (or terminal) care (shumatuski iryo)” was not popular.
However, as was the case with the original Process Guideline, the re-
vised Process Guideline did not define the phrase “the Last Stage of
Life”. The MHLW again revised the Process Guideline in March 2018,
both to extend it to home-based care situations, and to include the
idea of ACP.
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the Guideline. After all, the Process Guideline is not le-
gally binding because, although the MHLW issues it, it
is not supported by any specific law.
Korea
In Korea, the LST Decision Act was passed in January
2016, and full enforcement of the law began in February
2018. As the name of the Act implies, it allows patients
with not only cancer but also other medical conditions
to receive hospice and palliative care. Additionally, it en-
ables people to create ADs about withdrawing LST and
sets up a national online registry system for storing ADs
and reviewing them.18 Physicians are granted access to
the registry and are therefore able to access an AD,
which can inform decision-making. The Act also stipu-
lates that a consensus between two or more family
members can be regarded as the patient’s will when the
patient does not have an AD or cannot express his or
her wishes.
Characteristically, the Korean act gives a two-fold def-
inition of “end-of-life”. “Terminal stage”, which is used
to define the terminal patient, is when a patient is ex-
pected to die in several months, and the provision of
hospice palliative care is considered appropriate. “The
end of life process” refers to situations where a patient’s
death is considered imminent due to rapid deterioration
of his or her condition and the withdrawal of LST is of-
fered as a choice. While clarifying the necessity of hos-
pice care, the Korean law is restricted in its application
to LST decisions, because an LST decision is only ap-
plicable at the very end of a disease process.
The Act also provides a clause covering a physician’s
order on LST (Life-Sustaining Treatment Plans), which
is a physician’s order written after consulting a patient
about her wishes about end-of-life care. The physician
may (or the patient may ask the physician to) inform the
patient about diagnosis, end-of-life care options, and
LST options, and prepare this document. When a phys-
ician places this document in the healthcare record, it
takes priority over any existing AD that purports to state
the patient’s preferences on LST. In a sense, this order
resembles the Physician Order for Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment (POLST) used in the various American States.
However, the Korean document is supposed to be used
within hospitals, whereas POLST is focused on emer-
gency medical services.
Taiwan
As explained above, Taiwan has two laws concerning
forgoing LST. The Hospice and Palliative Care Act al-
lows withdrawing and withholding LST from a termin-
ally ill patient who has a valid AD, which covers the
relevant treatment options and designates healthcare
proxies; if there is no AD, the patient’s family can sub-
mit a consent form on their behalf when patients cannot
express their will. The phrase “terminally ill patient” re-
fers to a person who is diagnosed by a physician as hav-
ing an incurable disease or injury and whose death is
imminent based on the best available medical evidence.
The PRAA, which was enacted in January 2016 and
enforced in January 2019, explicitly stipulated that
healthcare institutions and physicians are duty-bound to
tell patients about their medical conditions, treatments,
procedures, medications, and prognoses in order to
honour the patient’s right to know. It also stipulated
that, with a valid AD, LST (including ANH) can be with-
drawn from not only terminally ill patients but also pa-
tients in an irreversible coma, a persistent vegetative
state, and from those with severe dementia or other
medical conditions specified by the ordinance of the
MHW [3].
Although both laws stipulate forgoing LST, the PRAA
is complements the Hospice and Palliative Care Act by
focusing on a patient’s autonomy. As the PRAA expands
the clinical conditions to non-terminally ill patients and
includes ANH in the range of LST, advance care plan-
ning (ACP) must be conducted before any AD is made.
Such legal regulation of ACP is new to Taiwanese soci-
ety because, according to the Hospice and Palliative Care
Act, consensus-building among the involved parties is
not a necessary condition to forgo LST. The decision of
forgoing LST for terminally ill patients can be made ei-
ther with a patient’s AD or with their families’ consent.
Since Taiwan has little experience of ACP, this has been
a major focus of work since the enactment of PRAA in
2015: hospital staff are being trained in this area and
ACP groups, which consist of a physician, a nurse, and a
social worker, are being developed. After the enactment
of PRAA in 2016, the development of ACP groups in
hospital and provision of suitably knowledgeable hospital
personnel has been the main tasks of the enforcement in
2019 [46].
England
In England, there are many legal developments and pro-
fessional guidance documents pertinent to the issue of
forgoing LST, but for the sake of brevity, we focus on
the critical legislation and professional guidance. First,
17Incidentally, in 2015, the MHLW revised the title of the Process
Guideline to “the Process Guideline for the Medical Decision-making
at the Last Stage of Life (jinsei no saisyu dankai),” because the term
“end-of-life (or terminal) care (shumatuski iryo)” was not popular.
However, as was the case with the original Process Guideline, the re-
vised Process Guideline did not define the phrase “the Last Stage of
Life”. The MHLW again revised the Process Guideline in March 2018,
both to extend it to home-based care situations, and to include the
idea of ACP.
18The LST Decision Act uses the term “Advance Statement on Life-
Sustaining Treatment” for conventional AD.
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the MCA focuses on decisions made about, with and for
adults who lack mental capacity. Like the preceding
common law, the Act essentially defines capacity in
functional terms [47]. If a patient has capacity, they may
prepare an advance decision to refuse treatment that
might otherwise be provided when she or he lacks cap-
acity. Such a decision can apply to LST, provided that
the decision is written, signed and witnessed, and there
is a clear statement to the effect that the decision will
apply even if this will put the patient’s life at risk [48].
The MCA provides immunity for physicians who with-
hold or withdraw treatments from their patients if they
reasonably believe that an advance decision exists that is
valid and applicable to the treatment in question [4].
However, the Act does not require the patient’s medical
condition to be terminal in order to execute the patient’s
AD to forgo treatments.
The MCA also provides for surrogate decision-
making, through the LPA. The Act also empowers the
court to appoint a deputy to make decisions, for ex-
ample, in cases where there is a serious and enduring
lack of capacity, such as due to dementia. However, the
LPA is the main means by which a patient can appoint
someone to decide on his or her behalf. The MCA stipu-
lates that an attorney has the power to consent to or re-
fuse LST if the patient has explicitly so empowered the
attorney. Notably, however, an LPA is required to make
decisions in the best interests of the patient; as such,
there is always the possibility that an attorney’s decision
will be challenged on this basis.
Indeed, for patients who lack an AD or LPA, best in-
terests provide the test as to whether treatment – in-
cluding LST – should be provided. The Act enumerates,
rather than elaborates, the factors to be balanced in a
best interests decision [49]. The law in this area had
evolved considerably since Bland, with the courts in-
creasingly emphasising the holistic nature of the assess-
ment, i.e. medical factors, which had been dominant in
the 1993 ruling, were not the only consideration [50].
The MCA seeks to emphasise the breadth of the test, as
have the courts – including the Supreme Court, the now
superior English court – in subsequent rulings [51]. Cli-
nicians are required to consult appropriately in deter-
mining a patient’s best interests. If there is no one close
to a patient to provide input into the decision, the Act
also provides an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate
(hereafter IMCA) service, which can support decision-
making by and for incapacitated patients in their best in-
terests [52, 53].
A further recent legal change concerns patients with
prolonged disorders of consciousness. Bland had re-
quired decisions about ANH for patients in the PVS to
come to court, a requirement which was later extended
to patients in the MCS. Although that requirement
persisted for decades, recent rulings have confirmed that
this is not strictly the law: as such, these cases should no
longer routinely come to court, although they may do
so, for example, if there is disagreement between the
relevant parties about what is in the patient’s best inter-
ests [33].
The second crucial regulatory source is the GMC
guidance on decision-making in end-of-life care. The
GMC guidance addresses issues surrounding decision-
making in end-of-life care and provides decision-making
models for patients who can decide as well as those who
lack the capacity to do so [54].19 The guideline advises
physicians to provide or forgo LST when they judge that
these would not be clinically appropriate for a patient.
When making such judgments, physicians must weigh
the benefits of treatment against the burdens and risks
for the patient. Furthermore, physicians should carefully
take into account not only clinical considerations but
also other factors relevant to the circumstances of each
patient, including the patient’s wishes, values, and feel-
ings. It also emphasises the importance of ACP. Unlike
the MCA, the guidance defines the phrase, “approaching
the end of life”.20
Legal and philosophical issues
In this last section, we will discuss the legal and philo-
sophical issues that have emerged from the comparison
of regulatory frameworks relating to forgoing LST in
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England. In order to bring
about improvements in these frameworks, particularly
concerning end-of-life care, the following five points
must be addressed.
Defining ‘terminal stage’
First, the definition of terminal stage (or phase) can be
essential when considering a regulatory framework for
forgoing LST. As described in Section 2, the LST Deci-
sion Act in Korea and the Hospice and Palliative Care
Act in Taiwan permit patients to forgo treatment only in
the terminal stage. It makes the definition of ‘terminal
stage’ significant, not to mention the clinical judgement
of when a particular patient is in the terminal stage.
19The GMC guidance also addresses decision-making for children, in-
cluding neonates, and young people. Further details are provided in
the following guidance.
20The guidance defines the phrase as follows: for the purposes of this
guidance, patients are ‘approaching the end of life’ when they are likely
to die within the next 12months. This includes patients for whom
death is imminent (expected within a few hours or days) and those
with: (a) advanced, progressive, incurable conditions; (b) general frailty
and co-existing conditions that mean they are expected to die within
12 months; (c) existing conditions if they are at risk of dying from a
sudden acute crisis in their condition; and (d) life-threatening acute
conditions caused by sudden catastrophic events.
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Both Korean and Taiwanese laws stipulate that a patient
is in the terminal stage when his or her condition is diag-
nosed as irrecoverable and his or her death is imminent
with rapid deterioration of the condition. As explained
earlier, the Korean Act distinguishes between two phases
of the terminal stage; namely, the terminal stage when pa-
tients with irrecoverable conditions are expected to die
within several months, and the end-of-life stage when pa-
tients are facing imminent death with rapidly worsening
conditions. The Act only allows the latter patients to elect
for withdrawal of LST. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Act inter-
prets the terminal stage more conservatively and considers
terminal patients to be those who have been diagnosed as
having an incurable disease or injury, and who cannot
avoid death shortly based on the best available
medical evidence. This definition more or less
corresponds to “the end of life stage” in the Korean
Act.
Regarding the kind of medical conditions to which
the law applies, the Korean law limits the “terminal
stage” to patients with cancer, acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome (AIDS), chronic obstructive pulmon-
ary disease (COPD), and chronic hepatic disease, as
well as other diseases specified by the Ordinance of
the MHW.21 Patients with these conditions are eli-
gible for hospice palliative care in the terminal stage,
while no such limitation exists for patients in the
dying stage who are eligible to elect for termination
of LST. On the other hand, although there are similar
rules about the coverage of palliative care in the Tai-
wanese National Health Insurance system, the Hos-
pice and Palliative Care Act in Taiwan does not
specify any health conditions for patients in the ter-
minal stage to be eligible for forging LST.
In Japan, no law stipulates a definition of terminal
stage. The MHLW’s Process Guideline avoids provid-
ing a definition and only suggests several instances of
medical conditions which can be considered as reach-
ing a terminal stage, such as “when a patient’s prog-
nosis is predicted to be from a few days to 2-3
months in the case of terminal cancer”.22 England
also lacks such a stipulation; indeed, LST may be re-
fused, withdrawn or withheld regardless of the pa-
tient’s life-expectancy. The MCA, for example, is not
limited to patients in the terminal stage [4]. The
GMC guideline, however, states that patients are “ap-
proaching the end of life” when they are likely to die
within the next 12 months, which is broader than the
Korean or Taiwanese criteria.
We believe that the definition of terminal stage
should be neither too narrow nor too wide when spe-
cifying the period within which one can choose to
withdraw treatment. If the definition is too narrow
and the law only applies to patients who are expected
to die within a few days or even a few hours, the case
for withdrawing LST might not be so compelling, for
they will die in a short time in any case. That said,
however, there may be clinical (and ethical) reasons
for withdrawing treatment, even in such a short
period, to ensure that the imposition of treatment
does not adversely affect the dying process, and there
may also be cultural reasons for doing so, as demon-
strated by Taiwan’s “terminal discharge from hos-
pital”. On the other hand, if the definition is too
broad, the law might apply to those with incurable
diseases such as MND, end-stage renal disease
(ESRD), and Alzheimer’s disease, who may be able to
live for a relatively long period if treatment – such as
artificial ventilation, dialysis, or gastric fistula – is
continued. However, expanding the definition to in-
clude patients with such conditions might give rise to
concerns and confusion, particularly as such a defin-
ition would potentially include those who are early in
the disease trajectory, and therefore not in the “ter-
minal phase” as this is conventionally understood.
Moreover, patients who are diagnosed with such in-
curable diseases might feel threatened because the
regulatory framework such as law or guidelines would
classify them as “terminal patients” who can have
their treatments withdrawn. Of course, the
requirement that the patient must consent might dis-
pel any concerns these patients and their loved ones
might have – but we should also be mindful that
such patients might feel under pressure to “consent”
[55].
Alternatively, a strict definition of the terminal stage
could be avoided altogether. If the principle of autonomy
or the right of self-determination is considered para-
mount, then perhaps we may not need to limit forgoing
treatment to the terminal stage, as England’s MCA and
Taiwan’s new law seem to suggest. However, if we ad-
here to the idea that the patient can choose to have LST
withdrawn only at the terminal stage, then a defined set
of clinical criteria for “terminal stage” are likely to be
required.
21The revised law deleted these specific names of disease, and only
provided the criteria of terminal stage. The revised law was enforced
from 28 March, 2019.
22In the commentary for the Process Guideline published by the
MHLW, the terminal stage is not defined but the following situations
are considered as terminal stage: 1) a patient’s prognosis is predicted
to be from a few days to 2–3 months in the case of terminal cancer; 2)
a patient repeats acute exacerbation of chronic disease and falls into
poor prognosis; 3) a patient will die within months to years as the
sequelae of cerebrovascular disease or senile deterioration. Likewise,
the Science Council of Japan explains in the report that depending on
the disease and condition of a patient, terminal stage can be divided
into an acute type (e.g., emergency medical care), a subacute type (e.g.,
cancer), and a chronic type (e.g., senility, vegetative state, and
dementia).
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Based on our analysis, one important lesson is that the
purpose of defining the terminal stage should be clear.
In particular, two relevant objectives for defining the
term would be the specification of a period when
retreating from aggressive treatments and focusing on
palliative care is appropriate, and the determination of a
period when the patient or the family can choose to
withdraw LST. Furthermore, it appears that policy-
makers and professional societies should be required not
only to define the term but also to establish clinical cri-
teria for judging when patients with various conditions
are in the terminal stage.
Forgoing LST for non-terminal patients (e.g., patients with
MND and those in PVS)
The second issue is whether to allow patients who are
not in the terminal stage – but are suffering from condi-
tions such as MND or are in a PVS – to forgo LST. Such
patients who are not in the terminal stage can continue
living with the assistance of artificial ventilators and
ANH.
Our comparison has revealed different positions on
withdrawing or withholding LST from these non-
terminal patients. The Korean Act, for example, limits
the permissibility of treatment withdrawal to the dying
stage, thereby excluding non-terminal patients with PVS
or MND. Taiwan’s Hospice and Palliative Care Act also
applies only to terminal patients. However, the newly
enacted PRAA has a broader scope than the preceding
Act and allows even PVS patients to forgo LST. It
should be emphasised here that MND is not included in
the four conditions stipulated in Taiwan’s new Act. Eng-
land’s MCA does not have any such restrictions and thus
applies to both terminal and non-terminal patients. In
Japan, the draft AD Bill does not mention specific med-
ical conditions that would fall under the scope of the
Bill; presumably, however, neither the draft AD Bill nor
the MHLW’s Process Guideline applies to non-terminal
PVS or MND patients.
Not allowing MND patients to withdraw LST because
they are not terminal seems particularly problematic in
places like Japan, where tracheostomy with invasive
mechanical ventilation (TIV) rates for MND patients
may be the highest in the world [56], ranging from 24.5
to 45.9% [57–59]. Even if MND patients require artificial
ventilators or ANH, they can remain alive if they choose
to receive these treatments. If we understand the ter-
minal stage as an incurable and irreversible condition
that, regardless of the use or withdrawal of LST, will re-
sult in death within a relatively short time [60, 61]23,
then these MND patients are not terminal. In Japan,
however, although the MND patients’ choice of with-
holding LST seems to be respected [62], detaching artifi-
cial ventilators once they have been initiated is next to
impossible [63] and physicians who detach them from
MND patients are highly likely to be prosecuted [56,
64].24 In such circumstances, MND patients can choose
either to receive or not to receive LST, knowing that this
cannot later be withdrawn even if they desire it.
In these Asian countries, whether or not to allow
PVS and MND patients who are not in the terminal
stage to forgo LST remains controversial. England has
also struggled with the question of whether LST can
be withdrawn from MCS patients. The courts initially
appeared reluctant to authorise the withdrawal of
ANH from such patients, although they have become
more willing to countenance this, at least where there
is compelling evidence that the patient him- or her-
self would not consent to such treatment [65, 66].
Whether the law in this jurisdiction does enough to
respect the autonomy of (now) incapacitated patients
nevertheless remains a live issue [67].
Moral and legal differences between withdrawing and
withholding LST
In most Western countries including England, the com-
mon understanding is that there is no morally significant
difference between withholding and withdrawing treat-
ments [29, 68, 69]. Thus, withdrawing treatments is per-
mitted in circumstances in which withholding
treatments is permitted [70].
In contrast, such a view is not necessarily the norm in
Asia. According to a 2012 survey of physicians who
manage patients in intensive care units (ICUs) in 16
countries and regions in Asia, the proportion of respon-
dents who felt that withholding and withdrawing LST
were ethically dissimilar was 75% on average [71]. By
country or region, the largest was 90% in Pakistan,
followed by 86% in Bangladesh, while the lowest was
41% in Singapore, followed by 49% in Hong Kong. In
Japan, 71% responded that withholding and withdrawing
were ethically dissimilar; the percentages were 79% in
Korea and 80% in Taiwan. For example, in clinical set-
tings in Japan, the general idea is that withdrawing LST
is ethically more difficult than withholding it, and that
withdrawing LST is considered “unacceptable” [69, 72].
Legal scholars in Japan are also split on the legality of
withdrawing LST. For instance, according to one legal
scholar, “no medical professional has been prosecuted
23Actually, some state laws related to AD in the United States,
including those in New Jersey and Tennessee, stipulate a definition of
terminal stage.
24In fact, the ALS patient who requested his mother to remove his
artificial ventilator died after she removed it. The Yokohama District
Court sentenced his mother for inducing or aiding suicide or homicide
with consent in the case.
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for removing the artificial ventilator or the gastrostomy
feeding tube from a terminally-ill patient” since the pub-
lication of the Process Guideline by the MHLW in 2007
[73, 74], implying that withdrawing LST is not illegal if
one follows the protocol set by the Process Guideline.
On the other hand, some scholars think that, whereas
withholding treatment can be regarded as an instance of
omission, it is difficult to view withdrawing as such, and
thus claim that withdrawing and withholding treatment
is not necessarily legally equivalent [75, 76]. Thus, while
an absolute consensus exists regarding the legal status of
withholding LST, differing views are held on withdraw-
ing LST, not only among healthcare professionals but
also among legal scholars.
Several factors may underlie the difficulty of equating
withholding LST with withdrawing it. For example, a
qualitative survey of emergency physicians in Japan con-
ducted between 2006 and 2007 found the following fac-
tors to be motivations for avoiding the withdrawal of
artificial ventilators: 1) fear of criminal prosecution and
concern about unwanted media exposure; 2) concern for
the feelings of the patient’s family; 3) physicians’ psycho-
logical barriers to shortening patients’ lives by withdraw-
ing LST because they regard withdrawing LST to be an
act and not an omission; and 4) medical factors in the
acute phase of a severe condition, including the uncer-
tainty of treatment outcome (i.e., they cannot completely
deny that the patient may recover) [77]. The fact that
there is no law in Japan permitting the withdrawal of
LST may also be a background factor.
In summary, unlike their counterparts in Western
countries, many healthcare professionals, as well as some
legal scholars, in Asian countries still find it difficult to
equate withholding LST with withdrawing LST. More-
over, as the above discussion suggests, it may be neces-
sary to address the feelings of healthcare professionals
adequately when considering a legal framework for end-
of-life care.
Role of the family in end-of-life decision-making
Fourth, our comparative analysis revealed that the role
of the family (or, indeed, other loved ones) in England
differs from those in the three Asian countries. Although
the family plays a significant role in end-of-life decision-
making in all three Asian countries, the legal stipulations
concerning their role are slightly different. In Taiwan,
the Hospice and Palliative Care Act stipulates the role of
the family in end-of-life decision-making. The Act states
that patients may nominate a medical proxy in advance
and that the designated family member by law may con-
sent to forgo LST on behalf of terminally ill patients if
their will cannot be expressed and no AD has been
signed. The family members designated by law include
(in descending order of closeness): spouses, adult
children and adult grandchildren, parents, adult siblings,
grandparents, great-grandparents or collateral consan-
guinities within the third degree, lineal relatives by affin-
ity within the first degree. The law states that one
designated family member should sign the consent form
for forgoing LST. If there are disagreements concerning
forgoing LST among family members, the consent of the
closer family member should be prioritised following the
order of closeness.
In Korea, the LST Decision Act defines two aspects of
surrogate decision making, which involves family mem-
bers verifying the patient’s intention by witnessing (Art-
icle 17) and deciding for the patient (Article 18). The
Act also sets out the differing family input in each of the
cases. The family members considered relevant for wit-
nessing are: 1) spouse, 2) linear descendants, such as
children and grandchildren, 3) linear ascendants, such as
parents and grandparents, and 4) siblings, if there is no
one corresponding to 1)-3). As for the witnessing, the
requirement for verification is such that two family
members need to witness the patient expressing his or
her preferences for LST. However, the family members
are different in the case of surrogate decision making,
for the decision must be made by agreement of all rele-
vant members. Family members, in this case, include: 1)
spouses, 2) lineal descendants and ascendants with one
degree of kinship (i.e. parents and children,) 3) lineal de-
scendants and ascendants with two degrees of kinship
(i.e. grandparents, and grandchildren) 4) siblings, if there
is no one corresponding to 1)-3). Thus, the Korean Act
and the Taiwan Act differ, both in how they rank family
members and how the family’s will is decided when
there is no consensus.
In Japan, families have conventionally made medical
decisions on behalf of patients [78, 79]. The draft AD
Bill contains no provisions about the family’s ability to
forgo treatment for patients. The Process Guideline,
however, grants this role to the family of the patient, es-
pecially when the patient is incompetent and cannot ex-
press his or her will. In that case, the family either
presumes the patient’s will or, when that is not possible,
the healthcare team discusses with the family what will
be in the patient’s best interest. Interestingly, the com-
mentary of the Process Guideline explains that ‘family’ is
not restricted to family members as defined by law, but
can include people like trusted friends of the patient and
those who have supported the patient at the end of their
life.
In England, the MCA does not specify who may or
may not be an attorney (although he or she must be an
adult, i.e. of 18 years or older). Thus, unlike the three
Asian countries mentioned above, legally speaking, fam-
ily members are not automatically authorised to make
decisions about treatment on behalf of the patient who
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has lost his or her decision-making capacity. The legal
forms of LPA list people whom the patient trusts and
know well as examples of an attorney, i.e., spouses, part-
ners, adult children, or good friends [80]. Where the pa-
tient has not made an LPA, the relevant decision-maker
is still required to consult those caring for the patient or
interested in his or her welfare; no limit is placed on
who, precisely, should be consulted.
The general rule is that, when a proxy makes decisions
on behalf of the patient, it is crucial to represent the pa-
tient’s prior wishes or his or her best interests. Based on
our analysis, we believe that the following issues regard-
ing the role of the family need careful examination: 1)
whether or not family members are the best proxies or
advocates for incompetent patients [81]; and 2) whether
or not there is a chance that family members may priori-
tise their own interests over those of the patient because
they want to reduce financial or other types of burdens
or even to benefit financially, for example through inher-
itance [7]. In addition, there are other issues such as the
definition and scope of family [82].25,26 Compared with
England, the three Asian countries traditionally place a
greater emphasis on families and communities than on
individuals. Thus, patients will sometimes prefer to have
their family and physician decide the course of their
treatments rather than doing so themselves; such family-
based medical decision-making is said to be an expres-
sion of filial piety [83–87]. Further studies will be needed
to determine how a suitable framework for proxy
decision-making can be established in these Asian
countries.
Decision-making in the case of a patient without family
Lastly, our comparative analysis found that decision-
making with, about or for an incompetent patient who
lacks family or close friends may pose a severe problem.
Recently, the significant increase in dementia patients
has become a global issue; as of 2015, 46.8 million
people worldwide are living with dementia, and nearly
10 million new cases emerge every year [88]. Dementia
poses an enormous financial burden both on society and
the individual, as well as giving rise to such issues as
stigma and social isolation [89]. In the context of end-
of-life decision-making, the following question is espe-
cially important: who should make, or contribute to, de-
cisions, when patients with dementia who lack family or
close friends are unable to make treatment decisions for
themselves? In the three Asian countries highlighted
here, no specific regulatory framework covers such cases.
However, Japan’s Process Guideline recommends the es-
tablishment of a committee consisting of various experts
to deal with such complicated cases.
In England and Wales, the MCA makes provision for
those incapacitated adults who lack close family or
friends, namely, the IMCA service. The purpose of the
IMCA service is to represent and support particularly
vulnerable people who have no family or friends and
who lack the capacity to make important decisions about
(providing, withholding, or withdrawing) serious medical
treatments and changes in accommodation [52]. Clini-
cians must involve an IMCA when a decision about ser-
ious medical treatments is to be made in relation to
such patients. An IMCA will interview or meet in pri-
vate with the person who lacks mental capacity and ob-
tain the views of professionals and anybody else who can
provide information about the wishes, feelings, beliefs,
or values of the person. They work to determine any al-
ternative options, may examine relevant records, and
then must write a report on their findings. The number
of IMCA referrals regarding serious medical treatments
(including withholding or withdrawing ANH) was 2132
between April 2013 and March 2014 [90], but has been
increasing every year since 2007. Among these, patients
with dementia accounted for 21% (446 referrals).
The IMCA service of England and Wales is unique
among the four countries compared in this article [91].
We suggest that when lawmakers and policymakers
make regulatory frameworks concerning end-of-life care,
they should discuss not only ADs (including those
encompassing attorneys) and proxy decision-making by
the patient’s family, but also make provision for cases in
which people who lack ADs, family, or close friends lose
the capacity to make such decisions. The reason for this
is that there will always be those “unbefriended patients”
who cannot be helped by any of the standard legal
mechanisms that protect and promote autonomy
through the use of ADs, family, friends, or court-
appointed guardians [92].27 In such cases, establishing a
service such as England’s IMCA is one option, but the
use of clinical ethics support services, such as hospital-
based committees, may be another option, as suggested
by Japan’s Process Guideline. As one study has shown,
ethics consultation may be useful for resolving ethical
dilemmas that involve the forgoing of LST [93].
Some limitations of the present study should be noted.
Because our main focus was on laws and guidelines, our25See (A lineal relative by affinity refers to a lineal relation of his or her
spouse (such as a husband’s or wife’s parents or grandparents), and a
spouse of his or her lineal relation (a husband or wife such as a child
or a grandchild)) for different interpretations of family members in
Korea’s and Taiwan’s Acts.
26England’s MCA does not give such authority to family members
both on decision-making and consent on behalf of individuals.
27For example, there are more than 70,000 unbefriended patients and
long-term care residents in the United States. In addition, two signifi-
cant hospital studies found that 16% of patients admitted to an inten-
sive care unit (ICU) and 5% of patients who died in the ICU were
unbefriended.
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findings may not fully reflect the actual practice of
healthcare professionals in each of the four countries.
Thus, the actual practices in each country may be more
similar to that in other countries, even though legal and
other stipulations may suggest otherwise. Furthermore,
we could not compare data surrounding withdrawal of
LST among these four countries due to the lack of year-
round data from each [94–97]28. Future studies should
assess the actual practice(s) surrounding end-of-life care
of healthcare professionals and psycho-spiritual care in
end-of-life care in the four countries. Additionally, in a
pandemic or disaster situation such as the current
COVID-19 pandemic, ethically complex issues such as
the allocation of scarce healthcare resources may ad-
versely affect end-of-life care. Future research could use-
fully address such situations [98].
Conclusions
This study compared regulatory frameworks governing
forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England, and
presented five important legal and philosophical points:
1) the importance of defining the terminal stage and as-
sociated criteria for clinical judgment; 2) the importance
of discussions on withdrawing LST in PVS or MND pa-
tients who are not terminal; 3) the importance of
(re)considering any moral and legal differences between
withholding and withdrawing treatments; this is disputed
particularly in Asian countries; 4) the importance of as-
certaining the family’s role in end-of-life decision-
making; and 5) the importance of devising ways to deal
with incompetent patients who lack family or ADs. Fo-
cusing on these five points will be important for the es-
tablishment of better end-of-life regulatory frameworks
for these four countries and others.
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